The disruption of global energy flows that came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has emphasized the strategic significance of traditional energy to stakeholders around the globe. Although all participants had their own reasons for overstating the trip’s significance, there is no denying how far China and other MENA countries have come in recent decades. In addition to joint statements issued by all sides, Xi proposed eight major joint actions for pragmatic Sino-Arab cooperation spanning eight sectors, including development and security, along with fifty-six specific cooperative initiatives. During the visit, China and Saudi Arabia signed memoranda of understanding worth tens of billions of dollars, and the two sides reached a comprehensive cooperation plan encompassing 182 cooperative measures in eighteen fields, such as politics, the economy, trade, and investment. Xi Jinping, the leader of the People’s Republic of China, arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 7, 2022, to lead three summit meetings with the host country, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and leaders of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab League members (Syria was absent). Broaden the conversation about US engagement beyond security, and match it with transparency and public exposure to dispel false narratives about US withdrawal or a purported sole focus on security affairs.Ĭhina’s expanding interests in the Middle East.Allow for the possibility of China and the United States working independently in the region for its benefit, rather than looking for US allies and partners to reject Chinese development options.Promote the agency of regional partners and allies by encouraging them to clarify to Beijing that they will not participate in Chinese initiatives that compromise the US-led security architecture essential to the region’s peace and stability.Empower US allies and partners to make informed decisions regarding Chinese alternatives and promote risk management while limiting any adverse effects on US strategic priorities in the Middle East and their own national interests.The article concludes with the following key recommendations for US policymakers. Real power is steadily catching up to the willpower to undercut US hegemony, posing challenges to the United States MENA approach and to its regional allies and partners. Nevertheless, even though China currently lacks the capacity and will to replace the United States’ long-established integrated deterrence and alliance networks, its new initiatives should not be overlooked. Furthermore, it outlines what the future Chinese strategy might entail, and why its current form does a disservice to its stated objectives of regional peace and security. Using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Gulf security as case studies, it reveals the stark disparity between Beijing’s words and deeds. The discussion will then turn to internal Chinese debates about stepping up security and political involvement, highlighting a shared belief among Chinese MENA scholars that these measures are necessary. This report will begin by providing an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of China’s increased engagement and increased sense of urgency in the Middle East. Moreover, it will illustrate how China’s expanding presence has resulted in a firmer determination to get more involved in regional security and politics, most notably through Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative and New Security Architecture for the Middle East.
It will describe how China currently provides limited security alternatives that directly and indirectly undermine US dominance, even without displacing it. Second, this report will review the assumption that there is no substitute for the United States’ security and diplomatic dominance in the region. In doing so, it seeks to further integrate each nation’s development strategy with its own.
Indeed, China has been fortifying its strategic ties and expanding its cooperation by heavily investing in local Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, as well as the infrastructure and technologies of the future. First, while it is widely assumed that Beijing’s interests in the region are limited to energy security and economic ties, this report will show how cooperation has expanded in recent years across the board. This report addresses two widely held beliefs about the nature of China’s engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that ought to be revisited in light of notable developments.
FebruFull throttle in neutral: China’s new security architecture for the Middle East
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